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Net gains
The Voting Rights Act and Southern local government
RICHARD M. VALELLY
The Supreme Court—or more precisely, its regular majority in voting- 
rights cases (comprising Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, 
and Thomas)—is clearly worried about the impact of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 on state and local government^ Supreme Court decisions 
such as Shaw v. Reno (1993), Miller v. Johnson (1995), Abrams et al. v. 
Johnson et al. (1997) and Reno, Attorney General v. Bossier Parish 
School Board etal. (1997) reveal (1) overt suspicion of the Department of 
Justice, (2) a preference for restricting the department’s role in voting- 
rights policymaking, (3) considerable trust in the capacity of the federal 
courts to guide this policy domain reasonably well, and (4) a desire to di­
minish the “federalism costs” (to use Court language) of national regula­
tory oversight of local governmental election practices.
Taking my cue from Albert O. Hirschman’s widely known depiction of 
unnecessary pessimism in modern policy analysis, I argue that the 
Supreme Court’s majority has misconstrued the “federalism costs” of the 
Voting Rights Act and its administration and implementation by the Jus­
tice Department. What has happened with Southern local government is 
most assuredly not, I argue, a case of “jeopardy”: of seemingly progres­
sive reform posing threats to existing values and rights.^ *
* For valuable help and encouragement I thank the volume’s editor, Martha Derthick. The 
Woodrow Wilson Center graciously awarded me a guest scholarship in the summer of 
1994, which enabled me to draft this chapter’s earliest incarnation. Colin Apse, then on 
the Wilson Center’s staff, provided excellent research assistance that summer. More re­
cently, Peyton McCrary, of the Voting Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil 
Rights Division, was very generous with his knowledge and time, reading and closely 
commenting on several drafts. None of the above is liable in any way for any errors of 
fact, interpretation, or emphasis—everything I say here is my responsibility alone.
^ See Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cam­
bridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), on the origins of the
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The Court and the conservatives are not wrong to worry about “feder­
alism costs.” A large majority of the American public has strong confi­
dence in local government, in contrast to the minority support now en­
joyed by the federal government among the public.^ Happily for this 
majority, what has happened in locally implementing the Voting Rights 
Act does not contradict the value attached by the American public to 
American local government; instead, it supports it. The gains in the South 
to what local government is about, and to the values it serves, have been 
substantial as a result of the process that evolved during the 1970s and 
1980s.
For more than half a century, most local government in the South was 
“captured” government in the sense that it was disproportionately re­
sponsive to the partial interests of powerful local whites. A regional sys­
tem of loosely organized one-party politics, based on white supremacist 
solidarity, had fundamental consequences for local government. V. O. 
Key, Jr., communicated these consequences well in his classic study. 
Southern Politics:
A loosely organized politics with no stable centers of power or leadership for an 
entire state is in one sense admirably suited for dealing with the Negro question. 
A pulverized politics decentralizes power to county leaders and county officials 
and in some areas devolution is carried even further in that public officials do not 
cross the plantation boundary without invitation. ... In a granulated political 
structure of this kind with thousands of points of authority there is no point at 
which accountability can be enforced.'*
Local government in a fundamental sense was not public, impersonal, 
and impartial. The Voting Rights Act has helped to rebrighten the local 
line between the public and the private, and this has resulted in a more de­
sirable framework for each citizen’s experience of membership in the lo­
cal political community.^ Certainly the price of that rebrightening has
bias for pessimism in policy analysis. See also Hirschman, “The Rhetoric of Reform,” The 
American Prospect (Summer 1993): 148-52.
^ See Philadelphia Inquirer, “The Public’s View of Federal Powers,” inset to Steven Thomas, 
“Reassertion of Federal Role Shifts Power Back to Where It Always Was” (October 12, 
1997); page E-3 shows (on the basis of a poll for the Pew Research Center for the People 
8c the Press) that 65 percent of the public has confidence in city and local government, 61 
percent in state government, and 48 percent in the federal government.
'* V. O. Key, Jr., with the assistance of Alexander Heard, Southern Politics in State and Na­
tion (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984 [Knopf, 1949]), 307, note 9.
^ On the “citizenship impact” of policies, see Public Policy for Democracy, ed. Helen In­
gram and Steven Rathgeb Smith (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993).
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been some loss of local autonomy from national influences. But on bal­
ance it is a fair price.
Whether it has in fact been a fair price occasions strong disagreement 
though. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 might seem instead to have weak­
ened Southern grass-roots democracy, and thus to have enervated citizen­
ship at the local level. Southern local officials do not have sole custody, af­
ter all, of one of the most vital aspects of local self-government, that is, 
deciding what the electoral rules are. The Voting Rights Act has meant 
that successive congressional majorities, federal judges, a professional 
voting-rights bar, and the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department 
have all become key players in local voting-rights policy.
However, in doing this (goes the case against the local effects of the 
Voting Rights Act’s administration and implementation), these players 
have also perpetuated racial divisions by forcing local processes and out­
comes into a Procrustean bed of racialized categories subject to federal 
proscription. Furthermore, the partial loss of local custody of electoral- 
policy decisions has been largely to private actors, who have not hesitated 
to push beyond the legislative intent of 1965. Such organizations as the 
ACLU’s Voting Rights Project, Common Cause, the Lawyers’ Committee 
for Civil Rights under Law, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, 
and the NAACP-Legal Defense Fund, among others—not to mention the 
large foundations that aid their work—have in fact been critically impor­
tant protagonists in the voting-rights policy domain. Through their mon­
itoring of Southern local governmental decisions about electoral rules, 
voting-rights policy has shifted away from remedying impediments to the 
physical act of voting and toward questions about whether black voters 
can elect as many black public officials as they should be electing. The 
politics of black voting rights has therefore been about making black bal­
lots count. There is nothing wrong with that per se, but these groups did 
not run for office. No one elected them to make public policy.
I call this claim a regulatory-mischief view since it concentrates on how 
narrow groups govern a policy domain at the expense of local govern­
ment and the broader values it serves. Section I following describes this 
regulatory-mischief view in greater detail. The optimistic view ultimately 
propounded here becomes clearer through first describing its alternative. 
Section II lays out criticisms of the regulatory-mischief view. Section III 
emphasizes the Voting Rights Act’s renewal of local government (this is 
where my optimistic case comes in). Section IV briefly concludes my con­
tribution.
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I: BUILDING FACTION IN? THE REGULATORY-MISCHIEF VIEW
Any “federalism-costs” case against the Voting Rights Act’s administra­
tion and implementation runs up against the fact that with the Fifteenth 
Amendment the American people made an exception to whatever value 
they attach to local government. They did so in the weightiest and most 
conspicuous way provided by our polity’s procedures. Nor were the peo­
ple specific about how to enforce the amendment; the particular form of 
enforcement was left up to Congress.^
Still, it would be hard to argue that the people authorized rampant in­
terest-group liberalism as the mechanism of “delocalization.” Critics of 
voting rights politics have charged that liberal interest groups—recogniz­
ing the potency of Section 5—have hijacked the Voting Rights Act.^ Be­
cause Section 5 requires local jurisdictions to “pre-dear” rules changes 
with the Department of Justice, voting-rights groups can enter into the 
regulatory process at the national level.® Critics have also found the 1982 
amendments to the act, as well as a 1986 Supreme Court decision inter­
preting them, disturbing. In 1982 Congress strengthened the act to estab­
lish a tighter relationship between black voting and black officeholding. 
The Court’s 1986 decision, Thornburg v. Gingles, simplified the fact-find­
ing process for litigation under the amendment (known as Section 2 litiga­
tion). Again, interest groups were both sponsors and beneficiaries of these 
changes. They could now methodically pick off the many local jurisdic­
tions that lacked black officeholders. By the 1980s, goes the case against 
the Voting Rights Act’s local effects, interest groups effectively enveloped
* Political scientists, of course, have abandoned serious analytical use of the term “the peo­
ple,” but I use it here as a reminder of the special nature of democratic constitutionalism. 
The best brief introduction to the Fifteenth Amendment’s origins is David E. Kyvig, Ex­
plicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the US. Constitution, 1776-1995 (Lawrence: Uni­
versity Press of Kansas, 1996), 176-82.
^ My characterization represents a sharpening of themes in Timothy G. O’Rourke, “The 
1982 Amendments and the Voting Rights Paradox,” and Hugh Davis Graham, “Voting 
Rights and the American Regulatory State,” in Grofman and Davidson, Controversies in 
Minority Voting, 84-113 and 177-96. The basic work that launched critical assessment 
of the Voting Rights Act’s evolution, and several scholarly responses, is Abigail M. Thern- 
strom. Whose Votes Count? Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights (Cambridge, 
Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1987, for the Twentieth Century Fund). See also 
Stephan Thernstrom and Abigail Thernstrom, America in Black and White: One Nation, 
Indivisible (New York: Simon Sc Schuster, 1997), chap. 16; Raymond Wolters, Right 
Turn: William Bradford Reynolds, the Reagan Administration, and Black Civil Rights 
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996), chaps. 1-7.
* There is anecdotal evidence of group involvement in rule-making; see, for instance. Drew 
S. Days III, “Section 5 Enforcement and the Department of Justice,” in Grofman and 
Davidson, Controversies in Minority Voting, 52-65, esp. 61-3.
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local processes of making basic decisions about electoral rules within a 
central system of oversight and correction in which they predominated.
The evil said to follow from such expanded group influence is a lack of 
open debate (except for periodic congressional scrutiny) about how best 
to realize the aims of the Voting Rights Act. Absent the correcting influ­
ence of open public debate, a misunderstanding of democratic process has 
in turn emerged among such liberal groups as the ACLU’s Voting Rights 
Project, Common Cause, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and the NAACP-Legal 
Defense Fund. For instance, about a decade ago liberal voting-rights 
groups pushed for safe districting, that is, the idea that minority office­
holding depended on creating legislative districts with a population at 
least 65 percent hlack. (This level was chosen because black voter regis­
tration and turnout have historically lagged behind white levels.) Critics 
suggested that this remedy misconceived the requirements of political 
equality. Equality does not mean guaranteed outcomes. The proper reme­
dies for the losers in democratic majoritarian politics are inventive forms 
of coalition-building and public discussion.
II: LIMITS OF THE REGULATORY-MISCHIEF VIEW
The regulatory-mischief view thus holds that the Voting Rights Act’s pol­
itics has become an interest-driven subgovernment—a voting-rights ver­
sion of the way that, for instance, environmental policy is made within a 
system of interest groups, regulatory rule-making, and congressional 
committees.^ Any responsible student of democratic politics will recog­
nize that, if true, this would be a serious matter. Yet in key ways, the reg­
ulatory-mischief view misdescribes fundamental relationships among the 
Voting Rights Act, the politics of the act, and Southern local government.
Let me turn first to legal mobilization. Legal mobilization has three key 
elements: (1) an effort to win policy change in the courts, (2) an empow­
ering and politicizing effect among the first-order beneficiaries of such 
policy change, and (3) a broadly educative effect on other institutions and 
actors, for example Congress or former political opponents.^® In focusing
^ On subgovernment, see Bryan D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic 
Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994), chap. 7.
The term “legal mobilization” I borrow from Michael W. McCann, Rights at Work: Pay 
Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), esp. 5-12. McCann emphasizes the first two elements of ray definition. 
From Gerald Rosenberg’s discussion of the relative efficacy of group litigation I have bor­
rowed the third element. V. Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring
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on the emergence of legal mobilization in the post-1965 period, vital dis­
tinctions between the legal-mobilization account and the regulatory- 
mischief view will emerge. The regulatory-mischief view implies the exis­
tence of a dominant coalition of lawyers and black activists using a 
path-breaking law to establish a bureaucratic receivership of local gov­
ernments, all the while deploying rights talk.^i Legal mobilization, by 
contrast, implies that post-1965 events formed a new and often arduous 
phase in a long struggle to widen the inclusiveness of the American polity.
Legal mobilization for officeholding^^
The regulatory-mischief view says little about the resistance of white 
Democratic party politicians, but such foot-dragging was pervasive for at 
least a decade and a half after the Voting Rights Act. After 1965, white 
Southern officials sought to dilute the ballot. Reading the handwriting 
on the walls, many Southern state legislatures quietly but quickly recast 
local government with such devices as requiring local governments to 
adopt at-large voting. Blacks could vote, but few would hold office.
Such resistance to the Voting Rights Act transformed Southern local 
government into a battleground—and small wonder. The local and state 
offices sealed off by state legislators exercised important responsibilities. 
In Mississippi, for instance, county boards of supervisors levy county tax­
es, decide how to spend county money, direct bridge and road construc­
tion and maintenance, and appoint such boards as the welfare and plan­
ning boards. Until 1975, they also drew up jury lists for the state courts.
About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), esp. 25-6 discussing 
“extra-judicial” effects. Rosenberg, incidentally, is skeptical that legal mobilization is as 
effective as contentious collective action in winning policy and political change.
” The term “rights talk” was coined by Mary Ann Glendon in her book. Rights Talk: The 
Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: Free Press, 1991). For a judicious in­
troduction to the proposition that there are pluses and minuses to rights claims in politics 
and policy, see Marc Tandy, “Public Policy and Citizenship,” in Ingram and Smith, Pub­
lic Policy for Democracy, 19-44, esp. 27-31.
A lucid—indeed, gripping—study of the “legal-mobilization” response to white legisla­
tive resistance is Parker, Black Votes Count. Less readable but definitive and equally full 
of surprises is Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 
1965-1990, ed. Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman (Princeton: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1994), chaps. 2-9. This account is based on these sources.
Chandler Davidson defines vote dilution as “a process whereby election laws or prac­
tices, either singly or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting among an identifi­
able group to diminish the voting strength of at least one other group. Ethnic or racial mi­
nority vote dilution is a special case, in which the voting strength of an ethnic or racial 
minority group is diminished or canceled out by the bloc vote of the majority.” Chandler 
Davidson, “Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview,” in Minority Vote Dilution, ed. Chan­
dler Davidson (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1984), 4.
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Other self-evidently vital elective offices are the county school board and 
the county elections superintendent.
Indeed, this legislative movement to recast local government forms 
part of a larger pattern. Reading the legislative and political histories of 
the 1957, 1960, and 1964 Civil Rights Acts and the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act would reveal a detailed inventory of state and local efforts to resist 
implementation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
The major “reforms” included: (1) requiring or permitting county and 
municipal governments to substitute at-large voting for public office for 
district-based voting; (2) requiring or permitting these governments to es­
tablish majority-voting requirements for public office, thus preventing 
plurality black victory over a field of split white candidates; (3) convert­
ing elective offices to offices appointed by officials likely to have exclu­
sively white support; and (4) reapportioning of local district lines to cre­
ate white-majority voting districts.
Black out-migration from the South between the 1930s and 1950s had 
drained political jurisdictions of many potential voters. Thus these lay­
ered changes were quite effective responses to both the increased black 
voter registration from 1944 on and the sharp jump in black voter regis­
tration produced by the Voting Rights Act. They also blunted the poten­
tial impact of growing urban black concentrations on city officeholding.
What responses were available to civil-rights leaders? No two-party 
system exercised a check on those who pressed for these legislative re­
forms, nor was another eruption of sustained protest comparable to the 
heyday of civil-rights activity from 1961 to 1965 likely. Fortuitously, 
though, official white resistance in Deep South states during the 1961-64 
period attracted a new political resource: experienced white and black 
non-Southern lawyers willing and able to work with local black and 
white political activists and lawyers.
See David J. Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 6-132. From Reconstruction until 
the present, white conservatives have developed many ways to resist black electoral in­
volvement. The list includes but is not restricted to (1) private violence (hence the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1870); (2) private violence under the color of law (proscribed by the Ku 
Klux Klan Act, which in turn formed the basis for federal prosecutions of, for instance, 
the Neshoba County [Mississippi] law-enforcement officers who conspired to murder 
three civil-rights activists in the summer of 1964); (3) movement building (e.g., the Citi­
zens Council movement that began in 1956); (4) electoral mobilization (e.g., the States’ 
Rights Party of 1948); (5) litigation (e.g.. South Carolina’s suit challenging the constitu­
tionality of the Voting Rights Act); (6) constitution-writing (e.g., the Mississippi Consti­
tution of 1890); (7) reforms of legal-electoral structures (e.g., the establishment of white 
primaries); and (8) judicial and bureaucratic obstructionism (e.g., great delay in the fed­
eral district courts of Alabama and Mississippi during the early 1960s after legal motions 
of the United States on behalf of black voters).
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The elements of the legal mobilization that eventually emerged were 
laid in Washington, D.C., and in Mississippi during the summer of 1963 
and the Freedom Summer of 1964. During a ^JC^hite Flouse meeting 
with officials of the American Bar Association and the National Bar As­
sociation in 1963, President John F. Kennedy urged the formation of a 
volunteer legal effort in the South; this in turn led to the establishment of 
the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law (LCCR) and the 
LCCR’s invitation to Mississippi by the National Council of Churches. 
Also, about 130 volunteer lawyers donated vacation time during Free­
dom Summer under the auspices of the Lawyers’ Constitutional Defense 
Committee (LCDC), a consortium of legal officers from the Congress of 
Racial Equality, the American Civil Liberties Union, the NAACP-Legal 
Defense Fund, the American Jewish Congress, and the National Council 
of Churches.
Initially, volunteer lawyers handled the criminal cases of civil-rights 
workers facing local and state criminal prosecutions, but they quickly 
shifted into affirmative, as opposed to reactive, kinds of legal actions. 
They turned toward challenging antipicketing statutes and, more impor­
tant, voting-rights denials. The parent organizations also opened up per­
manent staff offices in the black business district of Jackson.
Then, in the wake of the Mississippi legislature’s thorough effort in 
1966 to cordon off officeholding from black politicians, the tiny liberal 
wing of the Mississippi Democratic party and the larger independent par­
ty, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), forged an alliance 
with LCCR, LCDC, and NAACP-Legal Defense Fund lawyers in Missis­
sippi. Together they focused on responding to the legislature’s burst of 
electoral reform through 1) acquiring major foundation support to pro­
vide a long-run material base and 2) launching Section 5 voting-rights 
litigation. In doing so, they provided a model for similar combinations 
in Alabama and Georgia; they also reinforced a long-standing inter­
est in combining electoral mobilization with litigation among African- 
American and Mexican-American organizations in Texas and other 
Southwestern states.
By 1969, legal mobilization led to a critically important Supreme 
Court decision, Allen v. State Board of Elections, which held that such di­
lutive devices as at-large plans and majority-vote requirements required 
clearance from the Justice Department under Section 5 before they be­
came legally effective. As shown in Table 10.1, legal mobilization was
On the Southwest, see Amy Bridges, Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the South­
west (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
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rather successful from then on. Not until 1980 did legal activists experi­
ence a severe crisis in the development of voting-rights law. They then 
turned to Congress and argued successfully for an amendment of the Vot­
ing Rights Act that would correct the Court’s sudden abandonment of es­
tablished principles favoring legal mobilization. In the decade following 
the 1982 congressional amendment of the Voting Rights Act, the 
Supreme Court played a key support role in legal mobilization (though 
now, of course, it no longer does).^^
To put the story another way, it was a long, uncertain struggle. The 
original networks of legal activists had their hands full; only gradually 
have new networks in other states emerged. Gaining reasonably full com­
pliance with Allen v. State Board of Elections at the state and local level 
took approximately ten years of follow-on litigation. Second, dilutive 
changes that preceded the Voting Rights Act were not covered by Allen; 
these have required separate litigation under the 1982 amendment to Sec­
tion 2 of the act. Third, not until the mid- to late 1970s and early 1980s 
did local associations pushing for legal mobilization emerge in South Car­
olina and parts of North Carolina, and not until the early 1980s could 
one really find them in Virginia.
Fourth, as Table 10.2 shows, substantial rates of local black office­
holding in states under complete VRA coverage are recent—within the 
last decade or so. (North Carolina is not listed because only part of it is 
under VRA coverage.) As one would expect from a legal-mobilization 
framework, the table suggests both (1) considerable delay in the emer­
gence of significant levels of local black officeholding and (2) considerable 
unevenness in VRA-covered states with regard to rates of black office­
holding, taking into account the percentage of the total voting-age popu­
lation that is black.
Two sets of figures are displayed in Table 10.2. The set on the left (de­
noted as [1]) shows figures for certain categories of local officeholders 
only—county commissioners, members of municipal governing bodies, 
sheriffs, and school-board members. The set on the right (denoted as [2]) 
shows figures for all local elected officials—including, for instance, coro­
ners, municipal sergeants, probate judges, and commissioners of special 
boards. The black voting-age population (VAP) as a percentage of the to­
tal voting-age population is displayed as a helpful benchmark. One might
** In addition to Parker, Black Votes Count, and Davidson and Grofman, Quiet Revolu­
tion, see Laughlin McDonald, “The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Rep­
resentation,” in Grofman and Davidson, Controversies in Minority Voting, 66-84.
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Table 10.2. Change in local officeholding by African-Americans in 
Southern states completely covered by the Voting Rights Act
Total
LEO’S
[1]
Total
BLEO’s
[1]
BLEO’s 
as %
[1]
All
LEO’S
[2]
All
BLEO’s
[2]
All
BLEO’s 
as %
[2]
Black
VAP
AL (1974) 2634 110 4.2% N.A. N.A. 23%
AL(1984) 2795 241 8.6% 3125 292 9% 23%
AL(1993) 2936 605 20.6% 3237 672 20% 22.7%
GA (1974) 4077 120 2.9% N.A. N.A. 22.9%
GA(1984) 4209 250 5.9% 4950 276 5.6% 24%
GA (1993) 4428 459 10.3% 5760 498 8.6% 24.6%
LA (1974) 2577 141 5.5% N.A. N.A. 26.6%
LA (1984) 2651 374 14% 2779 425 15.3% 27%
LA (1993) 3235 511 15.8% 3362 600 17.8% 27.9%
MS (1974) 2252 190 8.4% N.A. N.A. 31.4%
MS (1984) 2462 296 12% 3226 410 12.7% 31%
MS (1993) 2477 546 22% 3241 708 21.8% 31.6%
SC (1974) 1961 113 5.8% N.A. N.A. 26.4%
SC (1984) 1817 229 12.6% 2252 242 10.7% 27%
SC (1993) 2213 407 14.5% 2602 423 16.2% 26.9%
TX(1974) 11,467 117 1% N.A. N.A. 11.3%
TX (1984) 12,587 183 1.5% 18,749 215 1.1% 11%
TX(1993) 12,474 438 3.5% 18,636 447 2.4% 11.2%
VA (1974) 2002 61 3% N.A. N.A. 16.6%
VA(1984) 1994 86 4.3% 2451 100 4% 18%
VA(1993) 1999 125 6.2% 2456 141 5.7% 17.6%
expect that over time black local elected officials (BLEOs in the table) as a 
percentage of total local elected officials (LEOs in the table) would rise to­
ward black VAP (expressed as a percentage of the total VAP). Three 
states—Georgia, Texas, and Virginia—stand out for their relative lack of 
convergence.^^
By now, a major difference between the regulatory-mischief and legal-
Showing similar data for other ex-Confederate states, for Oklahoma, and for the Border 
States, where obstructions to black voting also emerged, is beyond this chapter’s scope. 
These figures are imperfect; several are no more than reasonable estimates. They were de­
rived by the author from the census of black elected officials produced by the Joint Cen­
ter for Political and Economic Studies (JCPES) in Washington, D.C. It is a testament to 
the enduring autonomy of local government that even at this late date in American polit­
ical evolution, and after more than two decades of data collection by JCPES, the Roster 
is often uncertain as to just how many local governments and local elected officials there 
really are. See National Roster of Black Elected Officials, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C: Joint 
Center for Political and Economic Studies, July 1975); Black Elected Officials: A Na­
tional Roster 1984 (New York: UNIPUB/R. R. Bowker and Company, 1984, for the Joint 
Center for Political and Economic Studies); Black Elected Officials: A National Roster
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mobilization views should be clear. The former view suggests a cozy 
arrangement for reshaping Southern local government according to cer­
tain criteria that would never pass the bar of public debate. But the merit 
of the latter is the clarity with which it communicates the point that en­
franchisement is not just one struggle—that is, the effort to allow the 
physical act of voting. Enfranchisement is at least two struggles. It has 
also been about access to the political good of officeholding and the best 
ways of constructing such access.
Also, legal mobilization has involved its own kind of public debate. It 
is true that courts are not, strictly speaking, deliberative institutions. But 
decisions have been made on the basis of careful public argument and the 
collection and assessment by courts of a wide range of relevant informa­
tion.
Bringing parties into the picture
Let me consider Voting Rights Act politics from another angle—its rela­
tionship to national party politics. Political parties always have a basic 
stake in how electoral institutions work, because they care about winning 
and retaining political offices and controlling representative institutions. 
Political-party leaders have preferences in such matters as reapportion­
ment, the registration of voters, and how votes are counted. They have to 
be brought into any picture of voting-rights politics. Doing so also chal­
lenges the basic claims of the regulatory-mischief view.^*
It may not be obvious, but the two major parties have an overlapping 
interest in protecting the regulatory framework that the act provides—al­
though their interests overlap for different reasons, as we shall see. Nei­
ther political party, therefore, seeks deregulation. In this context, groups 
and judges easily seem to be the only actors governing the policy domain. 
They provide all the movement and action. But in the background are 
major but unobtrusive stakeholders in voting-rights policy; the two na­
tional parties.
Consider first the Democratic party’s stake in voting rights. The Voting 
Rights Act has guaranteed the participation of an African-American con­
stituency very loyal to the Democratic party, helping the Democratic par-
1993 (Washington, D.C.; Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies Press, 1993, by 
arrangement with University Press of America).
** On theory and evidence regarding parties having preferences over electoral institutional 
design, cf. Richard M. Valelly, “National Parties and Disfranchisement,” in Classifying 
by Race, ed. Paul E. Peterson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 188-216.
Net gains 311
ty build biracial voter coalitions in the South. Although Republicans have 
dominated presidential elections since the 1960s, in large part because of 
growing strength among conservative Southern whites, Democrats have 
twice been able to use their strength in the South to gain unified govern­
ment. This record contrasts with that of the Republican party, which has 
not gained unified government in more than four decades. Electoral regu­
lation of the South has thus proved critical in giving Democrats windows 
of opportunity for major policy change—openings that they squandered, 
yes, but windows as wide as the “Reagan window” of 1981-3.*^
As for the Republican party, the Voting Rights Act does not impede it. 
Instead, the act provides a framework for party-building in a region 
where the Republican party was weak—and associated with the putative 
ills of Reconstruction—for several decades. By completing the entry of 
black Southerners into electoral politics, the act created a crucial opening 
for Republicans to develop strength in the region. White Southerners 
have more conservative policy preferences than black Southerners. Yet 
the entry of black Southerners into electoral politics drove Southern 
Democrats to become substantially more liberal in their policy stances, 
affording Republicans the chance to build partisan attachments among 
white Southerners.^®
More recently, national Republicans perceived the 1982 amendment 
to the Voting Rights Act as a chance to work with Southern legislatures to 
create majority-minority congressional districts. Republican strategists 
hoped that these new so-called safe districts would drain other districts of 
enough reliably Democratic black voters to increase Republican represen­
tation in the House of Representatives. Indeed, regaining control of the 
House was a vital strategic goal for Republicans, given the unhappy 
anomaly—for them, at least—of four decades of Democratic dominance 
there. Whether in fact the Republican strategy succeeded as intended in 
1994—when Republicans regained the House with the help of the
On windows of policymaking opportunity, cf. John T. S. Keeler, “Opening the Window 
for Reform: Mandates, Crises, and Extraordinary Policy-Making,” Comparative Politi­
cal Studies 25 (January 1993): 433-86.
On the increased liberalism of Southern Democrats, see James M. Glaser, Race, Cam­
paign Politics, & the Realignment in the South (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1996). For the consequences for the House of Representatives and the Senate, see David 
W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991). On Southern Republicans, cf. Earl Black and Merle Black, The Vital South: 
How Presidents Are Elected (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); 
Glaser, Race, Campaign Politics; and Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided 
by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), esp. chap. 8.
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South—is sharply debated, but there is no need to settle that debate here. 
My point is simply that the Voting Rights Act amendment of 1982 even­
tually stimulated party-building efforts by Republicans.^^
In other words, both of the major parties have important stakes in 
voting-rights policy, and neither has sought extensively to revise the regu­
latory framework established in 1965. The result? Voting-rights policy 
and politics look like a subsystem. Groups and lawyers affiliated with 
groups, most of them private or nonprofit, do almost all the work of 
shaping voting-rights law and policy. Government lawyers initiate only a 
very small percentage of cases—one estimate is 5 percent. As Gregory 
Caldeira puts it, “Enforcement of voting rights is . . . very much an activ­
ity of the private sector.Yet if both political parties are major (if low- 
profile) stakeholders in the act, then voting-rights politics is not really a 
policy subsystem operating largely out of view.
Indeed, subgovernments are ubiquitous in American politics, for at 
least three reasons:
1. American political parties cannot possibly place every policy issue and 
domain on the national party system’s agenda for electoral contestation.
2. Countervailing power in the group system is always distributed very un­
evenly.
3. Regulatory bureaucracy is essential to modern government.
Notwithstanding the inevitable ubiquity of subgovernments, voting- 
rights policymaking is not part of this universe. It comprises, in sharp
The marginal impact of this strategy—whose existence no one disputes—is open to argu­
ment. David Lublin suggests that the strategy’s political repercussions have been gen­
uinely consequential. See David Ian Lublin, “Race, Representation, and Redistricting,” 
in Peterson, Classifying by Race, 111-25, and Lublin, The Paradox of Representation: 
Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress (Princeton; Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1997). A far more skeptical view can be found in Pamela S. Karlan, “Loss and 
Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of the Century,” Vanderbilt Law Review 50 
(March 1997): 291-326, and Karlan, “Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in 
the Post-Shaw Era,” Cumberland Law Review 26: 2 (1995-96): 287-312. An analysis 
that would also yield skepticism is J. Morgan Kousser, “Shaw v. Reno and the Real World 
of Redistricting and Representation,” California Institute of Technology, Division of the 
Humanities and Social Sciences, Social Science Working Paper 915, February 1995; this 
work is rich with lessons about voting-rights politics since 1965. Other useful works are 
Michael Kelly, “Segregation Anxiety,” The New Yorker (November 20, 1995): 43-54; 
John R. Petrocik and Scott W. Desposato, “The Partisan Consequences of Majority- 
Minority Redistricting in the South, 1992 and 1994,” paper prepared for presentation at 
the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago Hilton and 
Towers, August 31-September 3, 1995; Carol Swain, “The Future of Black Representa­
tion,” The American Prospect (Fall 1995): 78-83.
Gregory A. Caldeira, “Litigation, Lobbying, and Voting Rights Law,” in Grofman and 
Davidson, Controversies in Minority Voting, 230-57.
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contrast, (1) legal struggle, (2) judicial governance, constrained by norms 
of statutory and constitutional interpretation and conducted on the basis 
of open, high-profile argument, and (3) the partisan use of strategic op­
portunities provided by the Voting Rights Act.
The regulatory-mischief view obviously provides valuable cautionary 
analysis, and it does so from within a rich analytical tradition.^^ But a 
fair-minded reading of what has happened since 1965 in Southern local 
government requires bringing legal mobilization and political parties into 
a discussion of voting-rights politics. Doing so strongly suggests that the 
Voting Rights Act’s politics simply has not engendered democratic 
pathologies.
There is more, as it happens, to bring in besides legal mobilization and 
political parties. Let us turn to a closer focus on a cluster of three topics: 
(1) the character of local government, (2) enfranchisement as a two-stage 
process, and (3) interactions between enfranchisement and local govern­
mental renewal.
Ill: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LOCAL CITIZENSHIP AND 
OFFICEHOLDING
The positive case for the role of the Voting Rights Act in Southern local 
government hinges on appreciating (1) the value of local government in 
democratic theory and relatedly (2) fair access to the political good of of­
ficeholding.
Autonomous local government is a democratic resource. Its worth to 
democracy comes in part from simple arithmetic: Given that the ratio of 
local offices to numbers of citizens in a local jurisdiction is much closer to 
unity than it is for other governmental levels, there are more possibilities 
for citizens to engage in governance—and more possibilities for citizens 
to have some personal knowledge of those who engage in governance. 
More citizens will either cross (or know people who cross) the line be­
tween the public and private domains and back.
Such line-crossing can reinforce people’s awareness that government is 
a public enterprise (at least in principle) and ought not be the creature of 
any group or organized interest.^"* The relatively enlarged ratio of offices
A book suggesting why this is a rich analytical tradition is James A. Morone, The Demo­
cratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American Government (New York: 
Basic Books, 1990).
Cf. Richard M. Valelly, “Public Policy for Reconnected Citizenship,” in Ingram and 
Smith, Public Policy for Democracy, 241-66, discussion at 244.
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to voters at the local level creates the possibility that—to paraphrase Aris­
totle—many citizens will rule and be ruled in turn.
Of course, one would not want to overstate this point about the possi­
bilities of local government. The constant probability of citizens crossing 
between public and private domains will be greater if local governmental 
offices are vigorously contested. Yet such robust conflict may not exist. 
On some accounts, it is less likely to exist at the local level because the 
policy responsibilities of local governments pale in comparison with 
those of state governments—and particularly national government. 
Speaking before a county commission or a borough council is, after all, a 
much different “line-crossing” experience than giving congressional testi­
mony or stepping up to the lectern to deliver an oral argument before the 
Supreme Court. Therefore the strength and number of moral or simply 
architectural reminders of being in the public domain differ at the level of 
county and local government.^^
Few people, however, can give congressional testimony about social 
policy; many more can speak before their borough council about fire, san­
itation, police, or recreational services. Relatively few people can serve in 
national or state office; relatively more can serve on school boards, town 
and city councils, and county commissions and assemblies.
Local governmental citizenship and officeholding can therefore leaven 
our politics with broadly diffused knowledge of government and political 
association. Notice, though, that the possibility for such leavening criti­
cally depends on local governments’ being public: They and their offices 
cannot belong to one group and not others. Otherwise there is no “line” 
between the public and private domains whose crossing subtly instructs 
local citizens and officeholders in government and political association. 
For local governments to perform their leavening function, they cannot— 
any more than governments at other levels—be openly biased in favor of 
one set of people.
Southern local government during the era of Jim Crow manifestly did 
not fill the bill. It was white government—the blacker the county or town, 
the dimmer the line between the public and private domains.^^ This 
brings up the value of fair access to political office.
Paul E. Peterson, City Limits (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1981); Steven Kel-
man. Making Public Policy: A Hopeful View of American Government (New York: Ba­
sic Books, 1987).
Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation.
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The political good of officeholding
Voting Rights Act politics is an interesting case of enfranchisement and 
officeholding among the enfranchised. But what happens when there is 
enfranchisement without officeholding? Women’s suffrage in America 
suggests an unfortunate answer.
The Nineteenth Amendment established female suffrage nationwide; 
in the absence of rapid gains in female officeholding, however, it shaped 
the national agenda only gradually. Another critically important factor 
was the collapse in the amendment’s aftermath of the dense infrastructure 
of women’s suffrage organizations, leaving no associations dedicated to 
mobilizing women as women or to producing viable female candidates 
for office. Not until rates of female officeholding began to increase in the 
1970s—half a century later—did a pronounced women’s-issues legisla­
tive agenda emerge. Enfranchisement without officeholding and the sur­
vival of mobilizing organizations appears, on the basis of the women’s 
suffrage case, to engender weak representation.^^
With weak representation, there is also what I call the problem of lin­
gering doubt: If the newly enfranchised are not fit for the responsibilities 
of public office why should they be fit for the other obligations and re­
wards of citizenship? Enfranchisement always occurs in a context of some 
hesitation. Invidious stereotypes long buttressed the barriers to full citi­
zenship. Without new forms of officeholding, such stereotypes may not 
dissipate, tainting the well of democratic change. Thus as late as 1972, 
about half the electorate agreed with the statement that “Women should 
take care of running their homes and leave running the country up to 
men,” and 63 percent agreed that “Most men are better suited emotion-
Cf. Barbara C. Burrell, A ^ontun’s Place Is in the House: Campaigning for Congress in 
the Feminist Era (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994) and Anne 
Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion; A Political Process Interpretation of the Women’s 
Movement (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). For an explanation of the 
collapse of women’s organizations after the Nineteenth Amendment, see Anna Harvey, 
“The Political Consequences of Suffrage Exclusion: Organizations, Institutions, and the 
Electoral Mobilization of Women,” Social Science History 20 (Spring 1996): 97-132. 
This is not to say that the culmination in 1920 of the struggle for female suffrage had no 
policy effects. See Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins 
of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Uni­
versity Press, 1992), esp. part 3. See also Kristi Andersen, After Suffrage: Women in Par­
tisan and Electoral Politics Before the New Deal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996). On “weak representation,” see Ira Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities: Race, 
Politics, and Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1976), 23-8.
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ally for politics than are most women.” Like all survey responses, these 
are not unambiguously clear, and their interpretation raises new ques­
tions. But it would be hard to say that they fulfilled the expectations of 
those who had pushed for women’s suffrage.^*
We now have several related propositions. The first is that local govern­
ment’s ratio of offices to citizens makes it a potential school of democra­
cy. Second, local government can enrich the enfranchisement process, 
since officeholding and the character of representation are no small mat­
ters for the quality of enfranchisement. Third, and implicit in the analysis 
so far, nationally sponsored enfranchisement can strengthen the demo­
cratic contributions of local government. With these propositions in mind, 
a comparison of the first and second Reconstruction periods is in order.
The two reconstructions of Southern local government
From 1867 to 1877, about two thousand black men served as federal, 
state, and local officeholders in the ex-Confederate states subject to con­
gressional Reconstruction. They were all undoubtedly strongly Republi­
can. In Eric Foner’s survey of these officeholders, using secondary work, 
the U.S. Census, and the Los Angeles Genealogical Library of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, he assembled a census of 1,465 of­
ficeholders. Foner omitted several hundred possible entries because the 
data were too sparse, but almost all of these were local officeholders. Of 
his sample, 78 percent were elected or appointed local officeholders. Thus 
the vast majority of all black officeholders were local officeholders, occu­
pying offices as diverse as boards of education, city councils, mayoralties, 
county commissions, magistracies, and streetcar commissions. They were 
concentrated in Deep South states with majority black or significantly 
black populations: South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, North Caroli­
na, Alabama, and Georgia, in that order. In all, Foner found 56 kinds of 
local officeholding. Some 20 percent of the total were justices of the 
peace, 11 percent were city council members, 9 percent were county com­
missioners, 7 percent were registrars, 6 percent were members of boards 
of education, 5 percent were police officers, and 4 percent were local- 
elections officials.
Burrell, A Woman’s Place, 15.
This account for Reconstruction and after relies heavily on evidence (and my calculations
from that evidence) in Eric Foner, Freedom's Lawmakers: A Directory of Black Office­
holders during Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), ix-xxv.
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For black officeholders such as James K. Green, an Alabama state 
politician, their service seems to have had enormous symbolic impor­
tance:
I believe that the colored people have done well, considering all their circum­
stances and surroundings, as emancipation made them. I for one was entirely ig­
norant; I knew nothing more than to obey my master; and there were thousands 
of us in the same attitude . . . but the tocsin of freedom sounded and knocked at 
the door and we walked out like free men and met the exigencies as they grew up, 
and shouldered the responsibilities.^®
From the perspective of the democratic theory sketched above, the dra­
ma of answering the “tocsin of freedom” takes on considerable meaning. 
Men risked their lives and livelihoods in many places, yet turnover among 
officeholders was high, in part to accommodate a demand for officehold­
ing. Local black citizens had unusually high expectations of the impor­
tance of local office, bringing all manner of problems before local black 
officials. Local government, thanks to national intervention, was a school 
of democracy.
Nonetheless, most local officeholders during Reconstruction were 
white. What, therefore, was local democracy like in those places where 
white Republicans largely governed, but in a context of robust black as- 
sociationalism.^^^ Historian Donald Nieman has recovered the fascinat­
ing story of Washington County, Texas, midway between Houston and 
Austin. It is probably representative of many (if only a minority of) 
Southern counties.
Consistent with other scholarship, Nieman shows that a vibrant black 
politics at the local level meant public employment for freedmen, exem­
plifying one of many labor-market alternatives that emerged with the col-
Foner, Freedom’s Lawmakers, s.v. James K. Green, 90-1.
Here 1 am adding a third case to my account of enfranchisement-as-process; To the cases 
of enfranchisement with and without officeholding, I add enfranchisement with some of­
ficeholding in a context of robust associationalism among the enfranchised. As Anna 
Harvey shows in “The Political Consequences of Suffrage Exclusion,” women’s associa­
tions largely collapsed after the Nineteenth Amendment. Black associationalism during 
Reconstruction, by contrast, was vibrant, partly because no black associations existed 
before the Civil War amendments; thus there was no issue of negotiating the transition to 
a new political context, as there was for women’s associations.
On white officeholding, see Randolph B. Campbell, “Grass Roots Reconstruction: The 
Personnel of County Government in Texas, 1865-1876,” Journal of Southern History 58 
(February 1992): 99—116; Donald G. Nieman, “African Americans and the Meaning of 
Freedom: Washington County, Texas, as a Case Study, 1865-1886,” Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 70:2 (1994): 541-82. Representativeness of Washington County discussed in e- 
mail message, “Washington County,” Donald Nieman to Richard Valelly, July 31, 1996, 
hard copy in possession of author (message cited with permission of Donald Nieman).
318 Richard M. Valelly
lapse of slavery. Republican officeholders also established outdoor poor 
relief for black as well as white citizens. Here they innovated in a way that 
Democrats promptly reversed when they gained office. Rather than re­
quire residence at a county poor farm, Washington County Republicans 
gave monthly payments to the aged and infirm and to widows and or­
phans requiring help.
It is in discussing the transformation of the local criminal-justice sys­
tem that Nieman breaks new ground. Between 1870 and 1876, the state 
district court and the county sheriff selected jurors from the registered- 
voter list. Rates of African-American jury service were high: About one- 
third of the jurors who served on 107 petit juries were black, while 40 to 
50 percent of grand juries were black. Although the state legislature acted 
in 1876 to curb black jury service, about a quarter of both petit and grand 
jurors in Washington County were black until 1884—at which time Dem­
ocrats violently crushed the local Republican party.
These juries consistently indicted blacks for property crimes at higher 
rates than for whites, but not at the punitively high rates typical of local 
justice where there was no African-American jury service. Evidently they 
did so because black property crime occurred at a higher rate. Also, for 
the period 1870-4, juries indicted blacks for crimes against the person at 
higher rates. Rates of conviction and the severity of punishment for 
black-on-black murder were also higher than for white-on-white murder. 
Black jurors were apparently determined to stop black-on-black crime; 
white jurors may have been more sanguine about private violence, and 
thus pushed for milder punishments of white-on-white murder.
Here Nieman’s historiography suggests an intricate insight into the 
possibilities of local government. Through their determination and suc­
cess in addressing black crime, black jurors constructed a new moral or­
der in a post-Emancipation South riddled with deep conflicts over how to 
cope with old and new forms of violence. This may be one of the reasons 
why court was generally well attended by both black and white citizens. 
Many whites preferred malign neglect of black-on-black crime. Indeed, 
the local white press complained about Washington County’s success in 
coping with black-on-black crime, finding it financially burdensome. But 
having constructed their own churches, schools, and communities in 
Emancipation’s aftermath, African-American leaders and citizens clearly 
intended to keep those institutions as free from social disorder as they 
could. The case of Washington County indicates that local government 
during Reconstruction could be a very special school of democracy in­
deed.
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What about the Second Reconstruction of local Southern government? 
No study that matches the rich depth of Nieman’s is yet available. Still, 
the evidence so far about local black officeholding yields several conclu­
sions.^^
First, black officeholding is symbolically quite important. As a con­
temporary South Carolina official has said, “There’s an inherent value in 
officeholding that goes far beyond picking up the garbage. A race of peo­
ple who are excluded from public office will always be second class.”^"^
Second, black officeholding has often stimulated black voter interest in 
local government (though less so in rural Deep South counties). It has also 
unsurprisingly led to conflicts over what black officeholders can and 
should do, thus heightening political factionalism among black Southern 
communities.
Third, although racially polarized voting persists, it is worth looking 
past the statistical indicators to note that fairly large numbers of whites 
vote for black candidates. Relatively speaking, few do; in absolute terms, 
however, many do.
Fourth, local services involving municipal construction and road ser­
vice have become more equally distributed within local jurisdictions. 
More police and fire protection has been extended to black neighbor­
hoods. But redistributing municipal or county jobs to blacks—other than 
the menial labor to which Jim Crow historically relegated them—has, not 
surprisingly, been much more difficult and controversial. Finally, local 
governments have more actively sought state or federal assistance that 
will benefit both black and white citizens.
On my reading, all of this counts as renewal—a rebrightening of the 
line between the public and private domains. It is impossible, of course, 
for local government to hold quite the same attraction for local citizens as 
it did during Reconstruction, despite the suggestion in survey results that
” The only two lengthy and systematic studies available are James W. Button, Blacks and 
Social Change: Impact of the Civil Rights Movement in Southern Communities (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1989) and Lawrence J. Hanks, The Struggle for Black 
Political Empowerment in Three Georgia Counties (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1987). Out of the fairly well-developed journal literature, I found a recent study of 
a Deep South county quite worthwhile: Pildes and Donoghue, “Cumulative Voting in the 
United States” (which ought actually to be titled “Cumulative Voting in Chilton County, 
Alabama, since 1988”). An overlooked but valuable treatment that manages to make is­
sues and debates in the scholarly literature come alive is “Hands That Picked Cotton: 
Black Politics in Today’s Rural South,” a documentary comparing local governmental 
electioneering and representation in rural black-belt Mississippi and small-town black- 
belt Louisiana; this 60-minute video, released in 1982, was directed by Alan Bell and Paul 
Stekler.
Grofman and Davidson, Quiet Revolution, 16.
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Americans cherish this level of government more than all others. Nation­
al and state governments now do much more. Also, local voting differs. In 
the nineteenth century, it occurred in the open, in front of one’s peers. 
One asked for a party ballot in plain sight of a neighbor or a former over­
seer. Local voting is much less stressful now, but it is also less publicly 
meaningful—an affair conducted at the end of a workday, in secret and in 
silence in a booth, somewhere in a school auditorium.
But the disappointment among black voters in the possibilities of local 
government speaks volumes about how they once prospectively valued— 
and still implicitly value—local government. White voters and local lead­
ers often seem unhappy about the particulars of voting-rights implemen­
tation. But there is scattered survey and anecdotal evidence suggesting 
overall white support for how the Voting Rights Act has influenced local 
government. At any rate, the resistance, discomfort, and adjustment of 
whites to local black political influence are marks of local government’s 
value to whites—otherwise, there would be sheer indifference.^^
It is far from clear just how the contemporary situation will evolve. Ac­
counts by participants in the post-1965 legal mobilization show that the 
overall experience was one of relative success for them. The periodization 
and characterization provided in Table 10.1 underscore this point. On the 
other hand, there is some evidence that state and local barriers to repre­
sentation may now be able to survive, or even reemerge, because of the 
Supreme Court’s hostility to race-conscious remedies for vote dilution.^^ 
One hopes that such a danger is not realized. Local government can 
teach the arts of citizenship and government more readily to more people 
than other levels of government. But it must be public and socially neutral 
government. The reconstruction of Southern local government restores 
such necessary features. Given the political instruction provided by open­
ly and publicly taming social frictions. Southern local governments may 
actually be better schools of local democracy than many non-Southern 
counties.
In addition to Pildes and Donoghue, “Cumulative Voting,” see Parker, Black Votes 
Count, 202—4 (though Parker finds the evidence less reassuring than others might). 
Worry about the future can be found in Jacqueline A. Berrien, “All Politics Are Local: 
The Extension of Shaw v. Reno to Local Election Systems,” Voting Rights Review (Vot­
ing Rights Program of the Southern Regional Council, Summer 1997, 14-17. See also 
Selwyn Carter, “Justice, Section 5 Targeted; Limits on Race Cost Minority State Seats,” 
Voting Rights Review, Summer 1996, 15-20. Some of the context for this worry can 
be explored in Saul Brenner and Harold J. Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of 
Precedent on the Supreme Court, 1946-1992 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995).
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IV: A DEMOCRATIC AUDIT
This chapter has closely considered what would seem to be an open-and- 
shut view of the Voting Rights Act, namely, that it is a powerful (perhaps 
too-powerful) engine of delocalization. This view has found support 
among the Supreme Court’s majority in voting-rights cases. If one were to 
imagine what might be called an audit of the Voting Rights Act’s politics, 
the regulatory-mischief view would advise entry of such debits as private 
government, subsequent misunderstanding of the democratic process, 
and substantial federalism costs.
Yet is it clear that those items must be placed in the debit column? The 
major parties, as well as groups, quietly implement the Fifteenth Amend­
ment. Also, the voting-rights policy domain is hardly shielded from pub­
lic scrutiny and discussion. In fact, it is in part an arena of democratic 
struggle.
Through such struggle there has been a renewal of Southern local gov­
ernment. In this respect, the Voting Rights Act opts for both nationalism 
and localism. Local governments have to be moderately neutral and de­
cently unbiased for them to enrich American citizenship. For more than 
half a century. Southern local governments did not serve the purpose; 
only in the last decade, really, have they again begun to do so. The truth is 
that the Voting Rights Act is a windfall for Southern local government. 
Enter into the credit column, then, the rejuvenation of a kind of local cit­
izenship and officeholding that existed all too briefly during Reconstruc­
tion and that betokens the promise of American democratic life.
